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Thatcher’s Pension Reforms  
Project Briefing 1, October 2014 
This 3-year AHRC-funded project began work in September. It will explore reforms to 
Britain’s pension system implemented by the Conservatives in the 1980s and consider their 
longer-term consequences, not least the way in which they continue to shape present day 
problems and constrain options for change. 
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Why the research matters 
The reforms of the 1980s marked a key moment in the development of Britain’s overall 
system of income replacement in old age. Yet, surprisingly, we lack any detailed survey of 
developments in that decade, let alone an expertly-conducted historical study utilising 
primary sources from the period. Without understanding the contribution these reforms 
made to our present pension problem how can we solve it effectively? Indeed, lacking such 
an understanding are we are in danger of repeating mistakes made in the past? For example: 
1. A persistent over-optimism about the ability and willingness of the private sector to 
provide decent pensions for the lower-paid;  
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2. An over-estimation of the ability and willingness of consumers to finance and 
prioritise necessary long-term saving over short- to medium-term consumption;  
3. A persistent under-estimation of the power of vested interests to obstruct and/or 
channel policy change;  
4. A failure fully to grasp the constraints placed on policy solutions by very long-term 
individual and collective contracts (both financial and political) in pensions;  
5. A continuing under-estimation of the complexity of the political and economic cost-
benefit calculations underpinning policy making in this field of policy; and  
6. A consistent tendency to achieve 'reform' by tinkering and adding new elements to 
the system, thus making the system increasingly complex and more difficult to 
reform in a sustainable way. 
Our working assumption is that all these mistakes were in evidence in the 1980s, as they 
were at other times in the history of UK pensions. By exploring them we aim to reveal their 
causes and consequences, and to help policy-makers avoid continuing to make them. 
In 2004 the Pensions Commission noted that an array of systematic failures meant that 
around 9 million British adults of working age faced retirement on an inadequate pension. 
The unrealistic proposition that the state pension would be sufficient despite only being 
uprated in line with prices, combined with the significant barriers to a voluntarist solution 
and an ageing population, had left us facing a severe pensions crisis.1 
 
N. Barr, ‘Pensions: An Overview of the Issues’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy (2006) 
‘the bewildering complexity of the UK pension system, state and private combined,  
…  reflects the impact of multiple decisions made over the last several decades’ 
Pensions Commission [The Turner Commission], First Report, 2004, p. xiii 
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How did we reach this point? Historical enquiry allows to uncover the origins of the crisis 
and to understand the shape of contemporary pension provision in Britain. This research 
project will focus on the Thatcher government’s reform of pensions in the 1980s, and on its 
contribution to the crisis in Britain’s pensions system. 
Pensions Reforms in the 1980s 
The 1980s witnessed a transformation of British pension policy.2 Over the preceding post-
war decades a broad consensus had developed that a basic pension would be provided by 
the state, with an additional earnings-related pension provided either by the state or by 
employers (albeit with disagreement over the relative generosity of state provision that was 
desirable).3 The consensus was perhaps best illustrated by the bi-partisan support for 
Labour’s white paper Better Pensions in 1974 and for the subsequent legislation that created 
the State Earnings Related Pension (SERPS) in 1978.4  
The Key Changes 
In 1980 the Conservative government re-indexed benefits (including the basic state pension) 
to increases in prices rather than in average earnings, in an attempt to reduce costs by 
roughly 2 per cent per annum. Four public reviews of social security built a commitment to 
that culminated in the 1986 Social Security Act. The act reduced existing state provision, and 
incentivised private pension alternatives: 
 The state earnings-related pension was now to be based on average lifetime 
earnings, rather than the twenty best years. 
 The value of SERPS inherited by surviving partners of contributors was reduced. 
 ‘Money purchase’ (now termed ‘defined contribution’) occupational schemes were 
permitted to contract out of SERPS. 
 © Telegraph Media Group Ltd, British Cartoon Archive, University of Kent, Nicholas Garland, Daily Telegraph, 27 May 1986 
1986 
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 A two per cent uplift to rebated tax added to all contributions to private pensions 
was offered to those contracting out (colloquially termed ‘the bribe’ in the industry).5 
The aims of reform were three-fold: to reduce the role of the state in pension provision; to 
move to a funded system provided by an expanded pensions industry in a City dynamised by 
the ‘big bang’ in 1986, a change intended to increase choice, promote individual 
responsibility, and spur the development of ‘popular capitalism’ and a ‘property owning 
democracy’; and, finally, to simplify the system.6   
This reform agenda is commonly traced to the activism of ‘New Right’ think-tanks (e.g. the 
Adam Smith Institute and the Centre for Policy Studies).7 The role of lobbying from financial 
service interest groups, as well as ‘Americanisation’, were also important factors. The 
relative importance of each will be assessed in this research project. 
Limits to Reform 
Despite the majoritarian system of government afforded to the Thatcher administration, 
there were clear constraints on the capacity for fundamental reforms.8 Path dependent 
effects certainly blocked the abolition of an existing system element (pensions, with their 
very long contractual obligations, being generally seen as the ‘locus classicus’ of path 
dependence by social scientists).9 The role of interest groups was also key. Norman Fowler’s 
initial proposals (including the abolition of SERPS) were resisted vigorously by Labour, by the 
trade unions, and by anti-poverty campaigners. The Treasury (which feared the short-term 
costs), a chancellor who disliked the whole concept of compelling people to take out a 
personal pension and, ironically, occupational pension providers and the life and pensions 
industry (which did not want to be compelled to cover the many workers on very low 
incomes who would be relatively costly to service and generate little revenue) were also 
opposed.10  
The result of such institutional and interest group resistance was that the original aims of 
reform were distorted. Most notably, personal pensions were installed as an addition to, 
rather than as a replacement for, SERPS. This increased the complexity of the overall system, 
but it also increased and complicated the interactions between its constituent elements.11  
The Consequences 
However well-intended, the reforms were ‘disastrous’, as the foremost scholar of British 
pensions history put it, leaving Britons with ‘the worst of all pension worlds’.12  
 The private sector failed in a sustainable way to fill the void left by increasingly 
inadequate state basic and earnings-related pensions. Many were left entirely 
dependent on declining state provision which contributed to rising poverty and 
growing inequality. 
 A mis-selling scandal, in which the private sector sold unsuitable pension products to 
the public, forced the pensions industry to make compensation payments of over 
£11 billion. Customer confidence in the whole concept of private pensions was 
severely undermined as a result. 
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 Consumers who did take out valid personal pensions turned out to be prone to 
contributing too little to make up for the loss of state pension rights and/or to ending 
their contributions within a few years of the policy being written. This may have been 
due to reduced trust in their provider, or an unwillingness/inability to keep up 
voluntary payments, but it served to limit their pension provision.13 High fees and 
poor returns served further to reduce the value of pension savings. 
Research Objectives 
This project will explore the roots, construction, implementation, and consequences, both 
intended and unintended, of the Thatcher pension reforms. It will examine the battle 
between ideas, interests, and institutions that took place over the Conservatives’ proposals; 
examine the compromises that were forced in the implementation of policy; and delineate 
the legacy of the policy changes that resulted. As social science historians we intend for the 




The project will be contemporary history research at its leading-edge: taking advantage of 
the transition to a 20-year rule for the release of official records and mining a rich seam of 
primary material. Primary source materials employed include: 
Archive Sources: National Archives (government papers); Conservative Party Archive; 
Margaret Thatcher archive (Churchill College, Cambridge); Centre for Policy Studies; TUC; 
CBI; Life Offices Association; Association of British Insurers; National Association of Pension 
Funds; Institute of Actuaries; and others. 
Key Research Questions 
 What were the sources of ‘New Right’ ideas in the field of pensions? 
How were they generated, disseminated, and injected into the policy 
process? 
 What debates and compromises took place within the Conservative 
Party concerning proposals for radical reform in pensions policy? 
 What advice was offered to ministers by experts, such as the 
Government Actuary, civil servants, and political advisors? 
 What opposition did reform proposals encounter, and how did the 
government respond? 
 What was the impact (both national and international) of the enacted 
reforms in the short-, medium-, and long-term? 
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Published Material: National Insurance Fund reviews; Government Actuary surveys of 
occupational pension schemes; green and white papers, Parliamentary reports, 
Parliamentary debates, pensions legislation; official studies; political pamphlets; election 
manifestos; conference proceedings of political parties, trade unions, and employers’ 
associations; newspapers and periodicals; publications by other interested parties such as 
the National Association of Pension Funds; National Statistics data; British Election Study 
data; Bank of England assessments of inflation expectation; company reports; political 
memoirs; newspapers and journals; etc. 
Oral history: We will conduct oral history interviews with policy actors, as well as holding a 
‘witness seminar’ to bring key political actors together to discuss the formation of policy as 
they remember it. 
Audience and Output 
 
The project is aimed both at scholars and policy practitioners. In its historical research the 
project will build on and extend the work of historians of postwar pensions but will also 
engage with social scientists. To this end, the project will engage with important debates in 
political science about institutional development in terms of feedback effects ('path 
dependence') that help to 'lock-in' particular institutional configurations; the ability of 
incremental change cumulatively to produce radical change; and the importance of policy 
networks and non-governmental actors in the policy process. The project will communicate 
its findings to practitioners and policy actors and, in the process, help to improve policy-
making.  
Dissemination of findings to other academics and experts via 
 A book  
 A number of articles in scholarly journals 
 A major conference with an associated book  
 Conference papers presented nationally and internationally 
 A PhD dissertation presenting results of research into the actuarial profession. 
Broader impact via 
 A witness seminar with full transcript made freely available  
 At least one policy paper 
 Shorter policy briefing notes for policy-makers and other interested parties 
 A project web-site and blog aimed at both policy practitioners and the general public  
 Publicity via press releases and a project Twitter feed  
‘The project will provide a link between contemporary historical research, 
political science theory, and present policy debates about the future of 
British pensions in the twenty-first century.’ 
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